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We study a zero-sum stochastic differential game in the nonnegative orthrant. The
state of the system is governed by controlled reﬂecting diffusions in the nonnegative
orthrant. We consider discounted and average payoff evaluation criteria. We prove
the existence of values and optimal strategies for both payoff criteria.  2002 Elsevier
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1. INTRODUCTION
We study a zero-sum stochastic differential game in the nonnegative
orthrant. This has a potential application in communication networks with
heavy trafﬁc. In communication networks we often encounter situations
where different users may have different objectives. Each user wishes to
optimize a certain performance measure related to his trafﬁc parameters,
e.g., minimizing delays, maximizing throughput, minimizing blocking prob-
abilities, etc. Conﬂicting situations arise when different users cannot coor-
dinate their actions, and hence the problem cannot be reduced to a single
control optimization problem. This can happen due to the nature of the
network, or some user may be tempted to beneﬁt at the expense of oth-
ers by choosing an individual “good” policy. This motivates us to treat the
problem in a game theoretic framework.
We ﬁrst present a heuristic description of the network model. A more
general problem will be discussed in the next section. Consider a sequence
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of open queueing networks consisting of d service stations with increas-
ing trafﬁc intensity. Let the sequence be parameterized by n so that in the
heavy trafﬁc limit n → ∞. Let Qni t denote the number of customers at
the service station i at time t of the nth network, and let Xni t = 1√nQni t
be the corresponding normalized process. Let Ani t be the number of cus-
tomers arriving at the ith server from outside by time t. Assume there are
M users (i.e., sources which send customers) for the networks. Each user
controls the arrival process in an implicit manner. Thus the arrival process
is a controlled counting process, the intensity of which is given by
λni xi u1     uM =
√
nλi
(
xi√
n
 u1     uM
)
+ nλi
(
xi√
n
)

i = 1 2     d (1.1)
where λi λi are nonnegative measurable functions, x = x1 x2     xd is
the state of the system, and xi denotes the number of customers at the ith
server. The intensity of the arrival process is split into two additive terms
with appropriate scaling. In the limiting situation as n → ∞, the function
λi contributes to the drift of the system which is being controlled by the
users by the appropriate choices of their actions u1 u2     uM from their
respective action spaces. The function λi contributes to the volatility (i.e.,
the uncertainty) of the system which is not controlled by the users. In other
words the users control the mean of the state but are not equipped to
control the sudden ﬂuctuations of the state process. For the nth network,
let Nnijt be the number of customers moving from server i to j by time
t and let Nni t denote the number of customers who complete service at
server i by time t. Let Nni0t be the number of customers who leave the
network from station i by time t. Then
Nni t =
d∑
j=0
Nnijt
We allow the users to control the service time as well, since by paying
additional charges they can opt for better quality of the service. As a
result, Nni t is a controlled counting process with intensity given as fol-
lows: when the state is at x = x1 x2     xd and the users choose their
actions u1 u2     uM from their respective action spaces, then the inten-
sity of the process is given by
µni xi u1     uM =
√
nµi
(
xi√
n
 u1     uM
)
+ nµi
(
xi√
n
)

i = 1 2     d (1.2)
The intensity of the service time process is also split into two terms
µi µi, which are nonnegative measurable functions with suitable scaling.
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Here again, in the limiting process the function µi contributes to the drift
of the system which is controlled by the users, and µi contributes to the
volatility of the system. Let pij 1 ≤ i ≤ d 0 ≤ j ≤ d, represent the prob-
ability that a customer goes to server j after completing the service from
server i. We designate the routing matrix by P = pij1≤i j≤d. To ensure
the stability of the system we assume that P has a spectral radius strictly
less than 1. We look at the limiting network—more precisely, the dynamics
of the limiting network when the trafﬁc is heavy. We say that the trafﬁc
in a network is heavy, if at each server the trafﬁc intensity, i.e., the ratio
of the mean service time to the mean interarrival time, is nearly 1. Hence
as n → ∞ we have to assume that the trafﬁc intensity of the nth network
tends to 1. To this end we assume that
λixi +
d∑
j=1
pjiµjxj − µixi = 0 x = x1     xd (1.3)
This ensures that the trafﬁc intensity tends to 1 as n → ∞. Note that
for a single server queue (1.3) reﬂects the fact that the intensity of the
arrival process and the intensity of the service time process are equal,
which is precisely the heavy trafﬁc condition. Hence the limiting process
represents the dynamics of a network with d servers under heavy trafﬁc
assumption. Following [16] we can show, under suitable assumptions, that
Xn· = (Xn1 ·Xn2 ·    Xnd·) converges weakly to the process X·,
which is represented by the stochastic differential equation given by
dXit= b¯iXt u1t     uMtdt +
∫ t
0
√
λiXisdWis
+
d∑
j=1
∫ t
0
√
pjiµjXjsdBjis
−
d∑
j=0
∫ t
0
√
pijµiXisdBijs + ξit −
d∑
j=1
pjiξjs
dξit= IXi = 0dξit t ≥ 0 i = 1 2     d
(1.4)
where Xt = (X1t    Xdt), and Wi· Bij· are the standard inde-
pendent Wiener process in  uit i = 1 2    M t ≥ 0, are the actions
taken by the users at time t, and
b¯ix u1     uM = λixi u1     uM +
d∑
j=1
pjiµjxj u1     uM
−µixi u2     uM
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The equation (1.4) represents a controlled diffusion process in the non-
negative orthrant. By a solution to (1.4) we mean a pair of continuous
time processes X· ξ·, where X· takes values in the nonnegative
orthrant. The process ξ· is a continuous time nondecreasing process which
increases only at the boundary of the orthrant. When X· hits the bound-
ary it is reﬂected instantaneously along a vector ﬁeld which we describe
below. The direction of reﬂection is given by the matrix I − P . When X·
hits the boundary point in xi = 0, it is reﬂected along I −Pi, the ith row
of I − P . On the boundary points xi1 = xi2 = · · · = xik = 0, the direc-
tion of reﬂection is 1
k
I − Pi1 + · · · + I − Pik 1 ≤ i1     ik k ≥ 2.
Under suitable assumptions, it can be shown that at the corner, the process
is never absorbed.
We now describe the differential game problem. Each user (referred to
as a player) considers the rest of the players as a single superplayer and
tries to ﬁnd a minimax equilibrium. This gives him an “optimal” strategy
against the worst case scenario, i.e., the aim of each player is to guarantee
the best performance under the worst case behavior of the superplayer. We
can view the situation as follows: each player takes the rest of the players
as his adversary. Since the actions of the superplayer are not completely
known to the particular player, to achieve his security strategy against the
worst case scenario, he assumes that he controls the arrival process, and
the superplayer tries to block him by controlling the service time. Thus, the
particular player, say player 1, controls the arrival process of the network,
and the superplayer controls the service time process through their actions.
Hence the drift b¯ takes the following form:
b¯ix u1 u2 = λixi u1 +
d∑
j=1
pjiµjxj u2 − µixi u2
where u1 denotes the action of player 1 and u2 denotes the actions of
the superplayer. (Here u2 represents the actions chosen by the players
2 3    M . Thus u2 replaces u2     uM in the previous notation.) We
assign a cost to the particular player, i.e., player 1 against the other players
(superplayer), as
rx u1 u2 = γu1 − θu2 − cx
where c· typically represents the holding cost, and γ > 0 and θ > 0 are
constants, u1 u2∈ 0 1. When the state is x and for the actions ui of
the player i, the player 1 incurs a cost rx u1 u2. Naturally, player 1 tries
to minimize the cost through his actions, whereas player 2 (superplayer)
tries to maximize the same through his actions. Thus we have reduced the
M-player game to a two-player game. An analogous model in discrete time
has been studied by Altman [2]. Motivated by this problem, we study a
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more general stochastic differential game with reﬂecting diffusion in the
orthrant, which we describe in the next section. In [5] Borkar and Ghosh
have studied stochastic differential games with nondegenerate diffusions
for various payoff criteria. Ghosh and Kumar [7] have studied zero-sum
stochastic differential games with reﬂecting (nondegenerate) diffusions in
a smooth bounded domain. In this paper we ﬁrst discretize the orthrant by
a sequence of bounded smooth domains. We then use the results from [7]
and limiting arguments to derive the corresponding results in the orthrant.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe a more gen-
eral problem which subsumes the game problem arising in the network. In
Section 3 we discuss the stochastic differential game with the discounted
payoff criteria. We show the existence of the value function and optimal
Markov strategies for both players. In Section 4, we study the ergodic pay-
off criterion. Using a Lyapunov-type stability assumption, we prove the exis-
tence of the value of the game and optimal Markov strategies for both
players. In Section 5 we apply our theory to a simpliﬁed model. Section 6
concludes the paper with a few remarks.
2. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND PRELIMINARIES
Let Ui i = 1 2, be compact metric spaces and let Vi = Ui be the
space of probability measures on Ui endowed with the Prohorov topology.
Let D = x ∈ dxi > 0 for all i = 1 2     d, and let D be the closure
of D.
Let b¯ D × U1 × U2 → d σ  D → d×d, and let γ be an d-valued
function deﬁned in a neighborhood of ∂D. Deﬁne b D× V1 × V2 → d by
bx v1 v2 =
∫
U2
∫
U1
b¯x u1 u2v1du1v2du2
for x ∈ D v1 ∈ V1 v2 ∈ V2
We consider a stochastic differential game with the state of the game evolv-
ing according to a controlled reﬂecting diffusion in the orthrant D. It is
represented by the following stochastic differential equation:
dXt = bXt v1t v2tdt + σXtdW t − γXtdξt
dξt = IXt ∈ ∂Ddξt t ≥ 0 (2.1)
X0 = x0 ∈ D ξ0 = 0
where W · is the standard Wiener process in d and vi· is a Vi-valued
process which is progressively measurable with respect to the σ-ﬁeld gen-
erated by Xt. The process vi· is called an admissible strategy for the
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player i i = 1 2. By a solution to (2.1) we mean a pair of continuous time
processes X· ξ· satisfying (2.1). The process X· is D valued. In D
it evolves like a controlled diffusion process, and when it hits the bound-
ary, it is reﬂected instantaneously in the interior of D along the vector ﬁeld
governed by γ. The process ξ· is a nondecreasing process which increases
only when X· hits the boundary ∂D. We call Ai i = 1 2, the set of all
admissible strategies for player i. An admissible strategy vi ∈ Ai is said to
be a Markov strategy if vit = viXt for some vi D→ Vi measurable;
i.e., the choice of the action by player i at time t depends only on the state
of the dynamics at time t. By an abuse of notation, we denote the map vi
as the Markov strategy for player i. We denote by Mi the set of all Markov
strategies for the player i. The existence of a solution of (2.1) in a smooth
domain is usually proved by the well-known penalization method [12, 13].
But note that the domain D has a corner at the origin. This creates a tech-
nical problem. If the direction of reﬂection γ is not chosen properly then
the process Xt may be absorbed at the origin [15], a situation that is
unrealistic for application to network problems. To avoid the absorption of
Xt at the origin, we impose appropriate conditions on γ. The existence
of a solution of (2.1) is usually achieved in three steps: (i) approximate D
by appropriate smooth domains, (ii) establish the existence of a solution to
(2.1) in these smooth domains, (iii) use convergence arguments to obtain
a solution of (2.1) in D. To this end we ﬁrst approximate the nonnegative
orthrant D in the following way. For i = 1 2     d, m ≥ 1, deﬁne
Cim =
{
x ∈ D
∥∥∥∥ x1     xi−1 xi+1     xd −
(
1
m

1
m
    
1
m
)∥∥∥∥
<
1
m

1
m
≤ xi <∞
}
and
C0m =
{
x ∈ D
∥∥∥∥x1 x2     xd −
(
1
m

1
m
    
1
m
)∥∥∥∥ < 1m
}

Set
Iim =
{
x ∈ D
∣∣∣∣0 ≤ xj ≤ 1m j = i i j = 1     d 0 ≤ xi <∞
}

I0m =
{
x ∈ D
∣∣∣∣0 ≤ xj ≤ 1m for all j = 1     d
}

Deﬁne
Dim =
(
D\Iim
) ∪ Cim i ≥ 0 Dm = d⋃
i=1
Dim
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Then Dm satisﬁes the following properties.
(i) Dm ↑ D.
(ii) ∂Dm, the boundary of Dm, is C2.
(iii) For any K compact and K ⊆ D, we have K ⊆ Dm for m sufﬁ-
ciently large.
(iv) ∂Dm ∩ Ccim = ∂D ∩ Ccim i = 0 1     d m ≥ 1.
To ensure the existence of a unique solution of (2.1), we make the fol-
lowing assumptions on b σ , and γ.
(A1) (i) The function b is continuous, Lipschitz continuous in its ﬁrst
argument uniformly with respect to the rest.
(ii) The function σ is Lipschitz continuous.
(iii) The function deﬁned by a = σσ ′ is uniformly elliptic, i.e., there
exists δ0 > 0 such that
xa·x′ ≥ δ0x2 for all x ∈ D
(A2) (i) The function γ is such that all of the partial derivatives exist
and are continuous and there exists δ1 > 0 such that
γx · nx ≥ δ1 for all x ∈ +0
γx · nmx ≥ δ1 for all x ∈ ∂Dm
where
+0 = x ∈ ∂D  xi = 0 for at most one i = 1     d
and n· nm· denote, respectively, the outward normal to ∂D (on +0) and
∂Dm. Note that for m large enough γ is deﬁned on ∂Dm. So we can assume,
without loss of generality, that γ is deﬁned on ∂Dm for all m ≥ 1.
(ii) There exists a symmetric matrix valued map M d → d×d such
that M = mij mij ∈ Cbd ∩W 2∞d, for i j = 1 2     d, and sat-
isﬁes the following:
(a) There exists δ2 > 0 such that
Mx ≥ δ2Id for all x ∈ d
where Id denotes the d × d identity matrix.
(b) There exists C0 ≥ 0 such that
C0 x− x02 +
d∑
i j=1
mijxxi − x′iγjx ≥ 0 for all x ∈ ∂D x′ ∈ D
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(c) Let z ∈ D x ∈ ∂D. If for some C0 ≥ 0
C0 x− x02 +
d∑
i j=1
mijxxi − x′izj ≥ 0 for all x′ ∈ D
then z = θγx for some θ ≥ 0.
For a given v1 v2 ∈ A1 ×A2, under the assumptions (A1) and (A2),
(2.1) has a unique weak solution [12]. Moreover, if the players use Markov
strategies then the process X· is strong Markov.
Some comments are in order now.
Remark 2.1. When d = 2Dm has the following simple form:
Dm =
{[
1
m
∞
)
× 0∞
}
∪
{
0∞×
[
1
m
∞
)}
∪ B
((
1
m

1
m
)

1
m
)

Remark 2.2. (a) The assumptions (A1)(i), (ii) are the usual Lipschit-
zian assumptions. The assumption (A1)(iii) is the nondegeneracy condition.
In other words we are studying controlled nondegenerate reﬂecting diffu-
sion in the nonnegative orthrant.
(b) The assumption (A2)(i) ensures that when the process Xt hits
the boundary ∂D, it is reﬂected inward instantaneously along a direction
governed by γ, and it does not “slip” along the boundary.
(c) The assumption (A2)(ii) is rather technical. The condition is used
to get suitable estimates on the process Xt in appropriate seminorm,
which leads to the uniqueness of the solution of (2.1). For a smooth domain,
(A2)(ii) follows from (A2)(i); see [12] for details.
(d) Following [5] we give an interpretation of the admissible
strategies of the players. Note that an admissible strategy vi· for
player i i = 1 2, is a nonanticipative functional of the process X·,
i.e., vit = fitX· for a measurable, adapted (w.r.t. the σ-ﬁeld gen-
erated by Xt) fi· ·. The idea behind this is that whatever extraneous
randomization the players might want to incorporate into their controls is
already subsumed in the fact that they are choosing Vi-valued processes
rather than Ui-valued ones. One consequence of this is that the conditional
law of X·, given X0 = x, is a.s. the law of a process Xx · controlled
by strategies v′i· = fi·Xx ·, with Xx 0 = x. Thus we may pre-
scribe the strategies vi· for arbitrary initial data by prescribing the fi’s.
Therefore player 1 chooses the function f1, whereas player 2 chooses f2.
These choices are made independently of each other. This is how the strict
noncooperative nature of the game is maintained at all times.
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Remark 2.3. We now analyze the network problem discussed in Section
1 as a special case of (2.1). By renaming u2     uM as u2, the equation
(1.4) can be rewritten as
dXt = b¯Xt u1t u2t dt + +Xt dW˜ t − Id − P dξt
dξt = IXt ∈ ∂D dξt t ≥ 0 (2.2)
X0 = x0 ∈ D ξ0 = 0
where for x = x1     xd ∈ D ui ∈ Ui i = 1 2 P is the routing matrix,
b¯ix u1 u2 = λ¯ixi u1 +
d∑
j=1
pjiµ¯jxj u2 − µ¯ixi u2
+x = Ax B1x     Bdx
with
Ax = diag
(√
λ1x1    
√
λdxd
)

Bix =
(
B0i x B1i x     Bdi x
)

and
B0i x =
(
0     0−
√
µixi 0     0
)′

where −√µixi is the ith entry, and diag. stands for diagonal matrix,
B
j
i x =
(
0     0−
√
pijµixi 0     0
√
pijµixi 0     0
)′
 i = j
where −
√
pijµixi is the ith entry and
√
pijµixi is the jth entry,
Biix = 0     0′
Here ′ denotes the transpose and W˜ · = W˜i· B˜ij·1≤i≤d 0≤j≤d. We
make the following assumptions for the network problem.
(A1)′ (i) inf0≤x<∞miniλix µix > 0.
(ii) The spectral radius of P is strictly less than 1.
(iii) For x = x1     xd ∈ D,
λ1x1     λdxdI − P−1 > 0 µ1x1     µdxd > 0
i.e., each element of the vectors is strictly positive.
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(iv) For x ∈ D,
λixi +
d∑
j=1
pjiµjxj − µixi = 0 x = x1     xd
Using (A1)′(ii) we can show that ++′ is positive deﬁnite. Note that +
is not a square matrix. So by a martingale representation theorem [10,
pp. 382–390] there exists a d × d matrix valued function σ satisfying
σ·σ·′ = +·+·′ such that (2.2) is equivalent (in law) to
dXt = b¯Xt u1t u2tdt + σXtdW t − Id − Pdξt
dξt = IXt ∈ ∂Ddξt t ≥ 0 (2.3)
X0 = x0 ∈ D ξ0 = 0
Note that in (2.3), the direction of reﬂection γ does not satisfy the smooth-
ness property. In fact γ is piecewise constant. With the additional assump-
tions (A1)′, the equation (2.3) has a unique weak solution [16].
Remark 2.4. The assumption (A1)′(i) makes the diffusion matrix + real-
valued. The condition (A1)′(ii) guarantees that ++′ is positive deﬁnite and
the assumption (A1)′(iii) is the heavy trafﬁc condition.
We now describe the zero-sum stochastic differential game. Let r¯ D ×
U1 × U2 →  be the cost function. When the state of the system is x ∈ D
and player i chooses his action ui i = 1 2, player 2 receives a payoff
r¯x u1 u2 from player 1. Naturally, player 2 tries to maximize the cumula-
tive payoff and player 1 tries to minimize the same. We make the following
assumption for the cost function.
(A3) The function r¯ is bounded, continuous, and Lipschitz in its ﬁrst
argument uniformly with respect to the rest.
Deﬁne the function r D× V1 × V2 →  by
rx v1 v2 =
∫
U2
∫
U1
r¯x u1 u2v1du1v2du2
The planning horizon is inﬁnite, and we study two different types of payoff
criteria: discounted payoff and (long-run) average payoff.
Discounted Payoff
Let α > 0 be the discount factor. Let v1 v2 ∈ A1 × A2. The α-
discounted payoff to player 2 for the initial condition x ∈ D is deﬁned
by
Rαv1 v2x = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−αtrXt v1t v2tdt
∣∣∣∣X0 = x
]
 (2.4)
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A strategy v∗1 ∈ A1 is said to be α-discounted optimal for player 1 for initial
condition x if
Rα
[
v∗1 v˜2
]x ≤ sup
v2∈A2
inf
v1∈A1
Rαv1 v2x = Rαx (2.5)
for any v˜2 ∈ A2. The function Rα D→  is called the α-discounted lower
value function of the game. Similarly, a strategy v∗2 ∈ A2 is said to be α-
discounted optimal for player 2 for initial condition x if
Rα
[
v˜1 v
∗
2
]x ≥ inf
v1∈A1
sup
v2∈A2
Rαv1 v2x = Rαx (2.6)
for any v˜1 ∈ A1. The function Rα D→  is called the α-discounted upper
value function of the game. If Rα ≡ Rα, then the game is said to admit
a value for discounted criterion, and the common function is denoted by
Rα and is called an α-discounted value function. If a Markov strategy vi ∈
Mi is α-discounted optimal for all initial conditions, then it is said to be
α-discounted optimal for player i. Clearly the existence of a pair of α-
discounted optimal strategies for both players ensures that the α-discounted
value function exists.
Average Payoff
Let v1 v2 ∈ A1 ×A2. Then average payoff to player 1 for the initial
condition x is deﬁned as
Lv1 v2x = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
E
[∫ T
0
rXt v1t v2tdt
∣∣∣∣X0 = x
]
 (2.7)
The deﬁnitions of average optimal strategies and average value are similar.
For u1 u2 ∈ U1 ×U2 and for a suitable function f  D→  write
Lu1 u2f x = 1
2
d∑
i j=1
aijx
∂2f x
∂xi∂xj
+
d∑
i=1
b¯ix u1 u2
∂f x
∂xi
 (2.8)
More generally, for v1 v2 ∈ V1 × V2, we write
Lv1 v2f x =
∫
U2
∫
U1
Lu1 u2f xv1du1 v2du2 (2.9)
Remark 2.5. Note that the domain Dm has a smooth boundary. It is
unbounded, however. In the next section we use results from reﬂecting
diffusions in a smooth bounded domain. To do this we approximate the
domain Dm by an increasing sequence of smooth bounded domains Dmn in
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the following manner. Set In+1/m =
[
0 n+ 1
m
]d. Deﬁne for n ≥ 1 Cni  i =
1     d − 1, as follows.
Cn1 =
{
x ∈ d
∣∣∣∣ 0 ≤ xi ≤ n+ 1m 0 ≤ xj ≤ 1m i = j for i = 1 2     d
}
Cn2 =
{
x ∈ d
∣∣∣∣ 0 ≤ xi ≤ n+ 1m n ≤ xj ≤ n+ 1m 0 ≤ xk ≤ 1m k = i j
for i j = 1 2     d i = j
}

The sets Cni  i ≥ 3, are deﬁned in a similar fashion. Set for x =
x1     xd,
xk x′ = x1     xk−1 x′ xk+1     xd
and
xk1 k2 x′ x′′ = x1     xk1−1 x′ xk1+1     xk2−1 x′′ xk2+1     xd
Now deﬁne
En1 =
{
x ∈ d
∣∣∣∣ 0 < xi < n+ 1m∥∥∥∥x−
((
1
m
    
1
m
)i
 xi
)∥∥∥∥ < 1m i = 1     d
}
En2 =
{
x ∈ d
∣∣∣∣ 0 < xi < n+ 1m∥∥∥∥x−
((
1
m
    
1
m
)i j
 xi n
)∥∥∥∥ < 1m i j = 1     d i = j
}

The set Eni  i ≥ 3, is deﬁned similarly. Deﬁne
Dmn =
{
In+ 1m ∩Dm
∖ d−1⋃
i=1
Cni
}
∪
d−1⋃
i=1
Eni 
Then Dmn is an increasing sequence of bounded open sets in Dm with
smooth boundary ∂Dmn such that Dmn ↑ Dm as n→∞. Moreover, for any
open connected set I ⊆ ∂Dm, for sufﬁciently large n I ⊆ Dmn. When d = 2
we have a simple representation for Dmn,
Dmn =
{
Dm ∩
{[
0 n+ 1
m
)
×
[
0 n+ 1
m
)}∖
I˜n+1/m
}
∪B
(
1 n 1
m
)
∪ B
(
n n 1
m
)
∪ B
(
n 1 1
m
)
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where
I˜n+1/m =
{[
0
1
m
]
×
[
n n+ 1
m
]}
∪
{[
n n+ 1
m
]
×
[
0
1
m
]}
∪
{[
n n+ 1
m
]
×
[
n n+ 1
m
]}

In the next sections we consider stochastic differential equations on
domains Dmn. So we need the assumption (A2)(i) to be satisﬁed for Dmn
also. This can be achieved by extending γ to the whole of d such that γ
satisﬁes (A2)(i) on Dmn. We also consider a stochastic differential game
with state evolving according to (2.1) in Dm (or Dmn) with reﬂection along
γ. The deﬁnitions of the admissible and Markov strategies for these games
are analogous to the deﬁnitions in Section 2. By an abuse of notation we
continue to denote the set of all admissible and Markov strategies for
player i of these games by Ai and Mi, respectively.
3. DISCOUNTED PAYOFF CRITERION
The value function of a differential game is usually associated with the
solution of a nonlinear partial differential equation referred to as an Isaacs
equation. The Isaacs equation for an α-discounted payoff is given by
αφx = inf
v1∈V1
sup
v2∈V2
Lv1 v2φx + rx v1 v2 in D
= sup
v2∈V2
inf
v1∈V1
Lv1 v2φx + rx v1 v2 in D (3.1)
∂φ
∂γ
x = 0 on ∂D
Note that in (3.1) inf sup need not be equal to sup inf in general. In our
set-up we use a minimax theorem of Fan [6] to ensure the equality. Indeed
we show that (3.1) has a unique solution.
Theorem 3.1. Assume (A1)–(A3). Then the α-discounted value function
Rα· exists and is the unique bounded solution in C2 γD ∩C1 γD of (3.1)
for any γ ∈ 0 1.
Proof. Fix m ≥ 1. Consider the partial differential equation
αφmx= inf
v1∈V1
sup
v2∈V2
Lv1 v2φmx + rx v1 v2 in Dm
∂φm
∂γ
x = 0 on ∂Dm
(3.2)
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First we show that (3.2) has a solution in an appropriate sense.
Consider the partial differential equation
αφmnx= inf
v1∈V1
sup
v2∈V2
Lv1 v2φmnx + rx v1 v2 in Dmn
∂φmn
∂γ
x= 0 on ∂Dmn
(3.3)
Note that (3.3) is the Isaacs equation for the same stochastic differential
game with Dmn as the state space and with reﬂection on ∂Dmn along γ.
Hence from the result of [7] it follows that (3.3) has a unique solution
φmn ∈ C2Dmn ∩C1Dmn , and φmn is the α-discounted value function of
this game. Thus φmn is given by
φmnx = inf
v1∈A1
sup
v2∈A2
Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−αtrXt v1Xt v2Xtdt
]
 (3.4)
where X· is the process given by (2.1) in Dmn with reﬂection along γ,
corresponding to v1 v2 ∈ A1 × A2 (see Remark 2.5). From (3.4) it is
clear that
φmnx ≤
C
α
 x ∈ Dmn
where C > 0 is a bound for the cost function r¯ . Let Qk ⊂ Dm k ≥ 1, be
an increasing sequence of compact sets such that
⋃∞
k=1Qk = Dm. Let Nk
be a positive integer such that
Qk ⊆ Dmn for all n ≥ Nk k ≥ 1
Using the estimate from [11, Lemma 1.1, p. 247] there exists a constant
C1 > 0 which depends only on Cα b σ , and distQkDmNk such that
∇φmnL2Qk ≤ C1 for all n ≥ Nk
Then using the uniform Lipschitzian assumption in (A1), it follows from
(3.3) that
φmnW 2 2Qk ≤ C2 for all n ≥ Nk
where C2 > 0 is a constant depending on Cα b σ , and distQkDmNk.
We next use the estimates from [8, p. 177], for 2 ≤ p < ∞, to ﬁnd a
constant C3 > 0 depending on Cα b σ , and distQkDmNk such that
φmnW 2 pQk ≤ C3 for all n ≥ Nk
Since W 2 pQk is compactly imbedded in W 1 pQk, for each k ≥ 1,
there exists a subsequence, say φmnk, which converges to some φm in
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W 1 pQk. Now by a routine diagonalization argument, we have, along a
suitable subsequence,
φmn → φm in W 1 pQk for all k ≥ 1
Hence along a suitable subsequence (for simplicity of notation we denote
this by the same sequence)
φmn → φm in W 1 ploc Dm as n→∞ (3.5)
Hence, using the uniform Lipschitzian condition in (A1), we have
inf
v1∈V1
sup
v2∈V2
bx v1 v2 · ∇φmnx + rx v1 v2
→ inf
v1∈V1
sup
v2∈V2
bx v1 v2 · ∇φmx + rx v1 v2
in LplocDm 2 ≤ p <∞ (3.6)
Now using (3.5) and (3.6), it follows from (3.3), by letting n→∞, that
αφmx = inf
v1∈V1
sup
v2∈V2
Lv1 v2φmx + rx v1 v2 in D (3.7)
in the sense of distribution and φm ∈ W 1 ploc Dm. Using (A1)(iii), it fol-
lows from elliptic regularity results [8, p. 175] that φm ∈ W 2 ploc Dm ∩
W
1 p
loc Dm 2 ≤ p <∞. Clearly
φmx ≤
C
α
 x ∈ Dm
Let Q˜k ⊆ D k ≥ 1 be an increasing sequence of compact sets such that⋃∞
k=1 Q˜k = D and let Rk be a positive integer such that
Q˜k ⊆ Dm ∩ B0 R for all R ≥ Rk m ≥ Rk k ≥ 1
Then using the arguments as above, for 2 ≤ p <∞, we can ﬁnd a constant
C4 depending only on Cα b σ , and distQ˜kDRk ∩ B0 Rk such that
φmW 2 pQ˜k ≤ C4 for all m ≥ Rk
Now repeating the arguments described above, we can show that along a
subsequence
φm → φ in W 1 ploc D
and
αφx = inf
v1∈V1
sup
v2∈V2
Lv1 v2φx + rx v1 v2 in D (3.8)
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in the sense of distribution and φ ∈ W 1 ploc D. As before by [8, p. 175],
φ ∈ W 2 ploc D 2 ≤ p < ∞. Hence by the Sobolev imbedding theorem [1,
pp. 97–98] φ ∈ C2 γD ∩ C1 γD for any γ ∈ 0 1.
Now we show that ∂φ/∂γ = 0 on ∂D. Let O ⊆ ∂D be open bounded. Set
Om = O ∩ ∂Dm; then Om ↑ O. Fix m ≥ 1. Since Dm ⊆ Dk for all k ≥ m, we
can see that φk φ ∈ W 2 ploc Dm, for all k ≥ m p ≥ 2. Using (A2)(i) and
the trace result from [9, pp. 63–64], we have
∂φk
∂γ

∂φ
∂γ
∈ W 1−1/pploc ∂Dmn for all n ≥ 1 k ≥ m
By the continuity of the trace map, ψ → ∂ψ/∂γ from W 1 pDmn →
W 1−1/pp∂Dmn, we have for a ﬁxed m,
∂φk
∂γ
→ ∂φ
∂γ
in W 1−1/pp∂Dmn as k→∞ for all n ≥ 1
Since Om ⊂ ∂Dmn is bounded, for n large enough (say, n0), Om ⊂ ∂Dmn0 .
Therefore ∂φk/∂γ = 0 on Om. Since
∂φk
∂γ
→ ∂φ
∂γ
in W 1−1/pp∂Dmn0 as k→∞
we have ∂φ/∂γ = 0 a.e. in Om. Therefore,
∂φ
∂γ
= 0 a.e. in O
This in turn implies that
∂φ
∂γ
= 0 a.e. on ∂D
Hence φ satisﬁes (3.2). Thus from Fan’s minimax theorem [6], it follows
that
inf
v1∈V1
sup
v2∈V2
Lv1 v2φx + rx v1 v2
= sup
v2∈V2
inf
v1∈V1
Lv1 v2φx + rx v1 v2 a.e. x ∈ D
Hence φ is a solution of (3.1). By a measurable selection theorem [4], there
exist v∗1 ∈M1 and v∗2 ∈M2 such that
αφx = sup
v2∈V2
Lv∗1 v2φx + rx v∗1x v2 a.e. in D (3.9)
αφx = inf
v1∈V1
Lv1 v∗2φx + rx v1 v∗2x a.e. in D (3.10)
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Let v2 ∈ A2 and let v∗1 ∈ M1 be as in (3.9). Let X· be the process given
by (2.1) in D corresponding to v∗1 v2 with the initial condition X0 =
x. Then by standard arguments involving Ito’s formula for the function
e−αtφ· and for the process X·, it follows as in [7] that
φx ≥ E
[∫ ∞
0
e−αtrXt v∗1Xt v2tdt
]
= Rαv∗1 v2x for all v2 ∈M2
Therefore,
φx ≥ sup
v2∈A2
Rαv∗1 v2x
Similarly,
φx ≤ inf
v1∈A1
Rαv1 v∗2x
Thus it follows that
φx = Rαx = Rαx x ∈ D
Hence the value function Rα· exists and is a bounded solution to (3.1)
in the desired class of functions. Now to complete the proof we have to
establish the uniqueness of the solution. For this, suppose ψ to be another
bounded solution to (3.1) in the same class of functions. Let K > 0 be a
common bound for Rα· and ψ·. Using Ito’s formula, it can be shown
as in [7] that
Rαx − ψx ≤ 2e−αtK t ≥ 0 x ∈ D
Letting t →∞ we have Rα ≡ ψ.
By closely mimicking the arguments in [7] we can prove the following
theorem concerning the existence of optimal strategies. We omit the details.
Theorem 3.2. Let v∗1 ∈M1 be such that
sup
v2∈V2
bx v∗1x v2 · ∇Rαx + rx v∗1x v2
= inf
v1∈V1
sup
v2∈V2
bx v1 v2 · ∇Rαx + rx v1 v2 a.e. in D(3.11)
Then v∗1 is α-discounted optimal for player 1. Similarly, let v
∗
2 ∈ M2 be such
that
inf
v1∈V1
bx v1 v∗2x · ∇Rαx + rx v1 v∗2x
= sup
v2∈V2
inf
v1∈V1
bx v1 v2 · ∇Rαx + rx v1 v2 a.e. in D (3.12)
Then v∗2 is α-discounted optimal for player 2.
stochastic differential game in the orthrant 29
Remark 3.1. The existence of the outer minimizing selector v∗1 ∈ M1
in (3.11) and the outer maximizing selector v∗2 ∈ M2 in (3.12) is guaran-
teed by a measurable selection theorem [4]. Hence Theorem 3.2 proves the
existence of α-discounted optimal Markov strategies for both players.
Remark 3.2. From the proof of Theorem 3.1, we can see that, by invok-
ing Fan’s minimax theorem and an appropriate application of Ito’s formula,
the α-discounted value function of the stochastic game with state given
by (2.1) in Dm with reﬂection on ∂Dm along γ exists and is the unique
bounded solution in W 2 ploc Dm ∩ W 1 ploc Dm, 2 ≤ p < ∞, of the Isaacs
equation
αφmx = inf
v1∈V1
sup
v2∈V2
Lv1 v2φmx + rx v1 v2 in Dm
= sup
v2∈V2
inf
v1∈V1
Lv1 v2φmx + rx v1 v2 in Dm (3.13)
∂φm
∂γ
x = 0 on ∂Dm
This fact will be used in the next section.
4. ERGODIC PAYOFF CRITERION
In the ergodic payoff, the asymptotic behavior of the system plays a cru-
cial role. Hence we make a further assumption to ensure the stability of
the system.
(A4) There exist a symmetric positive deﬁnite matrix Q and a scalar
λ > 0 such that, for all x y ∈ D, u1 u2 ∈ U1 ×U2,
2b¯x y u1 u2 · Qx− y −
Qx− y′ax yQx− y
x− y′Qx− y
+ trace ax yQ ≤ −λx− y2
where ax y = σx − σyσx − σy′, and b¯x y u1 u2 =
b¯x u1 u2 − b¯x u1 u2.
First we give a couple of examples where the assumption (A4) is satisﬁed.
Example 4.1. Let Ui = 0 1di , i = 1 2 bx u1 u2 = Bx + C1u1 +
C2u2 σx = Id, x ∈ d, and ui ∈ Ui; let C1, C2 be real matrices of order
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d × d1, d × d2, respectively; and let B be a real d × d matrix with eigen-
values of B having negative real parts. Let Q be the symmetric positive
deﬁnite matrix satisfying B′Q+QB = −Id. Now for x = y,
2b¯x y u1 u2 · Qx− y
− Qx− y
′ax yQx− y
x− y′Qx− y + traceax yQ
= x− y′B′Q+QBx− y
= x− y′−Idx− y = −x− y2
Hence (A4) is satisﬁed for any λ ∈ 0 1.
Example 4.2. Let Ui = 0 12, i = 1 2, and for x = x1 x2 ∈ 2,
ui = ui1 ui2 ∈ Ui deﬁne
b¯x u1 u2 =
(
sin x1 0
0 cosx2
)(
u11
u12
)
+
(
sin x1 − cosx1
cosx2 sin x2
)(
u21
u22
)
−λ
(
x1
x2
)

where λ is a suitable constant. Set σx = Id. Then with Q = 12λId, we have
2b¯x y u1 u2 · Qx− y
− Qx− y
′ax yQx− y
x− y′Qx− y + traceax yQ
≤
(
5
λ
− 1
)
x− y
Hence for λ > 5, (A4) is satisﬁed.
Remark 4.1. Let v1 v2 ∈ M1 ×M2. Let X· be the corresponding
solution of (2.1). By (A1), (A2), and (A4), it follows from [14, pp. 19–21]
that Xt has a unique invariant measure denoted by ηv1 v2. Indeed,
using the Lyapunov function x′Qx1/2, we can prove the following addi-
tional result on the ﬂow governed by (2.1). An analogous result was
obtained in [3].
Lemma 4.1. Let v1 v2 ∈ A1 × A2 be given. For the initial condition
x ∈ Dm, let Xx · denote the corresponding process given by (2.1) with Dm as
the state space and the reﬂecting boundary condition along γ inDm. Then there
exists positive constants C5, C6 independent of v1 v2 and m ≥ 1, such that
EXx t −Xy t ≤ C6e−C5tx− y x y ∈ Dm
stochastic differential game in the orthrant 31
Proof. Let wx = x′Qx1/2, x ∈ Dm. Let ∂i denote the partial deriva-
tive with respect to the ith coordinate. Set
L˜v¯1 v¯2 =
d∑
i=1
bix v¯1 v¯2 − biy v¯1 v¯2∂i
+ 12
d∑
i j=1
aijx y∂i∂j v¯1 v¯2 ∈ V1 × V2
Now using (A4), for x = y, we have
L˜v1 v2wx− y ≤ − λ¯
2
x− y′Qx− y1/2x− y2
where λ¯ depends only on λ > 0. Hence for some C5 > 0
L˜v1 v2wx− y ≤ −C5wx− y x = y x y ∈ Dm
Let τ = inft ≥ 0  Xx t = Xy t. Using Ito’s formula and the above
inequality, we have
EwXx t ∧ τ −Xy t ∧ τ − wx− y
≤ −C5E
∫ t∧τ
0
wXx s −Xy sds
Since (2.1) evolving in Dm has a pathwise unique solution (see [11]), we
have for t ≥ τ, Xx t = Xy t a.s. Hence
EwXx t −Xy t ≤ wx− y − C5E
∫ t
0
wXx s −Xy sds
Using Grownwall’s lemma, we have
EwXx t −Xy t ≤ e−C5twx− y x y ∈ Dm
Since Q is positive deﬁnite, we have
EXx t −Xy t ≤ C6e−C5tx− y x y ∈ Dm
where C6 > 0 depends only on the smallest and largest eigenvalues of Q.
As in the discounted payoff, we prove the existence of the value of the
game and the optimal Markov strategies by analytic methods. The Isaacs
equations for the average payoff criterion are given by,
ρ = inf
v1∈V1
sup
v2∈V2
Lv1v2φx + rx v1 v2 in D
= sup
v2∈V2
inf
v1∈V1
Lv1v2φx + rx v1 v2 in D (4.1)
∂φ
∂γ
x = 0 on ∂D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where ρ is a scalar and φ is a suitable function. By a solution we mean a
pair ρφ satisfying (4.1) in an appropriate sense. Let
H =
{
φ ∈ ⋂
2≤p<∞
(
W
2 p
loc D ∩W 1 ploc D
) ∣∣ φx ≤ C ′1+ x
for some C ′ > 0
}

Theorem 4.1. Under assumptions (A1), (A2), (A3), and (A4), the equa-
tion (4.1) has a unique solution in H × , satisfying φx0 = 0 0 = x0 ∈ D,
ﬁxed.
Proof. Consider the partial differential equation
ρ= inf
v1∈V1
sup
v2∈V2
Lv1v2φmx + rx v1 v2 in Dm
∂φm
∂γ
x= 0 on ∂Dm
(4.2)
Since x0 = 0, we choose m large enough to ensure that x0 ∈ Dm. First
we prove that (4.2) has a solution in an appropriate class of functions. Let
φαm· denote the α-discounted value function of the stochastic differential
game where the state is given by (2.1) and with Dm as the state space with
reﬂecting boundary condition along γ on Dm. Then by Remark 3.2, φαm·
is the unique bounded solution in W 2 ploc Dm ∩W 2 ploc Dm 2 ≤ p < ∞ of
(3.13). For x y ∈ Dm,
φαmx −φαmy =
∣∣∣∣ infv1∈A1 supv2∈A2 E
[∫ ∞
0
e−αtrXx t v1t v2tdt
− inf
v1∈A1
sup
v2∈A2
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−αtrXy t v1t v2tdt
∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
v1∈A1 v2∈A2
E
∫ ∞
0
e−αt
∣∣∣∣rXx t v1t v2t
− rXy t v1t v2t
∣∣∣∣dt
≤ C7C6
∫ ∞
0
e−αte−C2tx− ydt
= C7C6
α+ C5
x− y
where the last inequality follows by Lemma 4.1 and (A3). Hence
φαmx −φαmy ≤ C8x− y (4.3)
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where C8 > 0 is independent of α. Let φ˜αmx = φαmx − φαmx0. Then
φ˜αm· is the unique bounded solution in W 2 ploc Dm ∩W 1 ploc Dm 2 ≤ p <
∞, of
αφαx0+αφ˜αx= inf
v1∈V1
sup
v2∈V2
Lv1v2φ˜αmx+rxv1v2 in Dm
∂φ˜αm
∂γ
x=0 on ∂Dm
(4.4)
Let Q ⊆ Dm be a compact subset. From (4.3) we can see that φ˜αm· is
bounded by a constant which depends only on C8 and the diameter(Q),
uniformly in α ∈ 0 1. By the estimate from [11, Lemma 1.1, p. 247], there
exists a constant C9 > 0 which depends only on C b σC8, diameter(Q),
and distQDm and is independent of 0 < α < 1, such that
∇φ˜αmL2Q ≤ C9
Now using arguments similar to those used in the proof of Theorem 3.1,
we can show that, along a suitable sequence αn → 0,
φ˜
αn
m → φm in W 1 ploc Dm 2 ≤ p <∞
Let ρm be a limit point of αnφ
αn
m x0. By letting n → ∞ in (4.4), we
can show as in the proof of Theorem 3.1 that φm ρm ∈ W 2 ploc Dm ∩
W
1 p
loc Dm ×  2 ≤ p <∞, satisfying (4.2). Moreover, it is clear that
φm ≤ C111+ x x ∈ Dm
where C11 > 0 is independent of m.
Let Qk ⊆ D k ≥ 1, be an increasing sequence of compact sets so that⋃∞
k=1Qk = D. Let Rk be a positive integer such that
Qk ⊆ Dm ∩ B0 R for all R ≥ Rk m ≥ Rk k ≥ 1
Now repeating the arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3.1, there exists a
constant C12 > 0 which depends only on C b σ , and distQkD∩B0 Rk
such that
φmW 2 pQk ≤ C12 for all m ≥ Rk
Also, ρm ≤ C, where C > 0 is a bound for r¯. Hence along a suitable
subsequence,
φm ρm → φρ∗ in W 1 pQ × 
Now by a routine diagonalization argument as in the proof of Theorem 3.1,
we can show that along a suitable subsequence,
φm ρm → φρ∗ in W 1 ploc D ×  (4.5)
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Now using arguments as in Theorem 3.1, we can show that φρ∗ is a
solution to (4.1) in W 2 ploc D ∩W 1 ploc D × . Clearly,
φx ≤ C111+ x
Let v∗1 ∈M1 and v∗2 ∈M2 be such that
ρ∗ = inf
v1∈V1
Lv1 v∗2xφx + rx v1 v∗2x a.e. (4.6)
ρ∗ = sup
v2∈V2
Lv∗1x v2φx + rx v∗1x v2 a.e. (4.7)
Let v2 ∈ A2 and let v∗1 ∈ M1 be as in (4.6). Let X· be the process given
by (2.1) in D corresponding to v∗1 v2 with the initial condition X0 = x.
Then by standard arguments involving Ito’s formula for the function eαtφ·
and for the process X·, as in [7], it follows that
ρ∗ ≥ lim inf
T→∞
Ex
[∫ T
0
rXt v∗1Xt v2tdt
]
= ρv∗1 v2 for all v2 ∈M2
Therefore,
ρ∗ ≥ sup
v2∈A2
ρv∗1 v2
Similarly,
ρ∗ ≤ inf
v1∈A1
ρv1 v∗2
Thus, ρ∗ = ρv∗1 v∗2. Moreover,
ρ∗ = ρ¯ = ρ
Hence ρ∗ is the value of the game. The uniqueness of φ can be obtained
by closely mimicking the arguments in [5]. We omit the details.
Finally, using Theorem 4.1, we can obtain the analog of Theorem 3.2.
We again omit the details.
Remark 4.2. As before, by the Sobolev imbedding theorem, φ ∈
C2 γD ∩ C1 γD for any γ ∈ 0 1.
Theorem 4.2. Let φρ∗ be the unique solution to (4.1). Let v∗1 ∈ M1
be such that
sup
v2∈V2
bx v∗1x v2 · ∇φx + rx v∗1x v2
= inf
v1∈V1
sup
v2∈V2
bx v1 v2 · ∇φx + rx v1 v2 ae in D (4.8)
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Then v∗1 is α-discounted optimal for player 1. Similarly, let v
∗
2 ∈ M2 be such
that
inf
v1∈V1
bx v1 v∗2x · ∇φx + rx v1 v∗2x
= sup
v2∈V2
inf
v1∈V1
bx v1 v2 · ∇φx + rx v1 v2 ae in D (4.9)
Then v∗2 is α-discounted optimal for player 2.
5. AN APPLICATION TO A QUEUING MODEL
We ﬁrst consider a simpliﬁed version of the model discussed in Section
1. Consider a heavy trafﬁc queue which is the limit of a sequence of queues
with one server. Let the intensity of the arrival process be
λnx u1 u2 =
√
nλ¯xu1 + nλ x ≥ 0
where λ λ¯ are suitable positive constants and u1 denotes the action of the
user (player 1) from the action space 0 1. The intensity of the service
time process is
µnx u1 u2 =
√
nµ¯xu2 + nµ x ≥ 0
where µ, µ¯ are suitable positive constants and u2 denotes the action of the
superuser (player 2) from the action space 0 1. The state of the queue is
governed by the stochastic differential equation
dXt = λ¯u1t − µ¯u2tXtdt + 
√
λ
√
µ · dW t + dξt
dξt = IXt = 0dξt t ≥ 0 (5.1)
X0 = x ξ0 = 0 x ≥ 0
where W = W1W2 is a standard 2-dimensional Wiener process and ui·
is a 0 1 valued nonanticipative process, which is the admissible strat-
egy for player i. The cost function is given by
r¯x u1 u2 = γu1 − θu2 − x2 γ θ > 0
where γ θ are suitable positive constants described in Section 1. For this
payoff function and the discount factor α > 0, the α-discounted Isaacs
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equation is given by
αφx= inf
v1∈01
sup
v2∈01
λ¯xv1 − µ¯xv2φ′x − x2 + γv1 − θv2
+ 12 λ+ µφ′′x x > 0
= sup
v2∈01
inf
v1∈01
λ¯xv1 − µ¯xv2φ′x − x2 + γv1 − θv2
+ 12 λ+ µφ′′x x > 0
φ′0= 0
(5.2)
Clearly the assumptions (A1), (A1) ′ are satisﬁed. Note that the function r¯
is unbounded. We can modify the arguments is Section 3, however, to show
that the α-discounted value function Rα is the unique solution of (5.2) in
the class of functions belonging to C20 ∞ ∩ C10 ∞ with quadratic
growth condition. Note that (5.2) can be written as
αφx = inf
v1∈01
λ¯xv1φ′x + γv1 + sup
v2∈01
−θv2 − µ¯xv2φ′x
−x2 + 12 λ+ µφ′′x x > 0 (5.3)
φ′0 = 0
Since 0 1 is convex and compact, the inﬁmum and the supremum are
attained at the extremum points. Hence (5.3) becomes
αφx = inf
u1∈01
λ¯xu1φ′x + γu1 + sup
u2∈01
−θu2 − µ¯xu2φ′x
−x2 + 12 λ+ µφ′′x x > 0 (5.4)
φ′0 = 0
Then by Theorem 3.2, the optimal strategy for player 1 is given by
v∗1x =


1 if λ¯xR′αx + γ < 0
p if λ¯xR′αx + γ = 0
0 if λ¯xR′αx + γ > 0,
(5.5)
where p is any value in 0 1. Similarly, the optimal strategy for player 2 is
v∗2x =


1 if µ¯xR′αx + θ < 0
p if µ¯xR′αx + θ = 0
0 if µ¯xR′αx + θ > 0.
(5.6)
Thus both players have nonrandomized Markov strategies, and the struc-
ture of the optimal strategies of both players are explicitly determined in
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terms of the value function. For the ergodic payoff criterion, we can obtain
analogous results. For the queueing network with d servers as described in
the Introduction, we can derive analogous results. It is difﬁcult, however,
to get the explicit structure of the optimal strategies as in (5.5), (5.6).
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we study an abstract stochastic game problem where the
state is given by the controlled reﬂecting diffusion in the nonnegative
orthrant. This abstract problem generalizes a differential game problem
arising in communication networks with heavy trafﬁc. For the abstract
problem, we establish the existence of the value and optimal Markov
strategies for both players. For the network problem, we establish the
existence of nonrandomized optimal Markov strategies for both players.
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